The postwar relationship between Iraq and
the United States is now a broader public topic. This week, the White
House and the Iraqi government announced that state-to-state
discussions are taking place with the goal of reaching detailed
agreements that will govern Iraq and America's long-term political,
economic and military ties. Iraqis have asked for "an enduring
relationship with America." I use the term "broader public topic" because this matter has
been a subject of constant discussion since April 2003, with little of
that discussion hush-hush. When I reported in May 2004 for duty in Iraq, the first document
dropped on my desk was a draft of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1546. After reading it with great interest, I discussed it with one of
the very smart young majors in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq plans
section. The very smart young major was already in the polymathic
process of analyzing requirements and aligning "capabilities with
tasks" (who will do what) in order to support the resolutions
stipulation that Iraq hold "direct democratic elections ... in no case
later than 31 January 2005."
Resolution 1546 was officially passed on June 8, 2004. If
you're a wire-service editor, eight months is an eon -- but if you're
trying to politically reinvent Mesopotamia, it's a millisecond. The
January 2005 Iraqi election succeeded, giving terrorists and tyrants a
disturbing "purple finger" -- the very public ink stains marking the
fingers of Iraqi voters. That election was an incremental success, but one of many.
This week's publicized call for a more "normalized" U.S.-Iraq
relationship is another indication that the incremental successes are
accumulating. Every increment can become a decrement, but war is a
dynamic process -- and from a historical perspective the dynamic
direction in Iraq has favored the United States -- in other words, the
big trend suggests an emerging success.
I know, that runs counter to Senate Majority Leader Harry
Reid's April 2007 declaration that the United States "lost" in Iraq,
but it was Reid's choice to make himself a sad historical footnote. This emerging success required lots of money and
unfortunately involved lots of blood. I had another document on my
Baghdad desk, Musab al-Zarqawi's February 2004 letter to al-Qaida's
leaders, in which he lamented al-Qaida's looming defeat. He also described his counter-strategy: a Shia-Sunni
sectarian war. That's war's hideous dynamic, effort met by effort --
with death, pain and suffering in each terrible collision. Zarqawi's
murderers did their best to incite a sectarian debacle. Oh, they got
headlines, they enlisted a motley array of criminal allies, they set
Iraq's democratic timetable back 12 to 24 months -- but they failed. The evidence that al-Qaida has suffered a major strategic
information defeat in Iraq continues to mount. StrategyPage.com noted
on Oct. 27, 2005, that "the Moslem media is less and less willing to be
an apologist for al-Qaida, at least when it comes to killing Moslem
civilians" and that the Iraqi media in particular "really has it in for
al-Qaida." On Oct. 1, 2006, StrategyPage.com argued that "dead Iraqis
were killing al-Qaida. ... Westerners, unless they observe Arab media
closely, and have contacts inside the Arab world, will not have noted
this sharp drop in al-Qaida's fortunes."
Within the last three months, the "trend" (made of incremental successes) has become "fact."
Is this victory in Iraq? No. But it suggests we've won a major
battle with potentially global significance. What the Pentagon calls
"the governmental (political participation and structure building),
information (intel, media and political perception) and economic
(economic development, infrastructure creation) lines of operation"
will ultimately secure victory in Iraq, and these operations will take
another six to eight years of effort. As for the "security line of operation" (military), the
U.S.-Iraqi "postwar relationships" discussion indicates both are
preparing for "strategic overwatch," where U.S. "quick reaction" forces
are positioned to help Iraq deter external (e.g., Iranian) threats.
Strategic overwatch may be a couple of years away, say mid-to-late
2009. Achieving that would constitute a limited victory.
Could these positive trends reverse? Yes. Al-Qaida and
Saddamist enemies will continue to test the will of Free Iraq and the
United States. Harry Reid and his faction could quit and declare
defeat. But I doubt that they will -- I very much doubt they will.
***
In responding to my column of Nov. 13, Tom Ricks at The
Washington Post asked me to note his Oct. 15, 2007, article on
al-Qaida's information warfare defeat. And a fine report it is.
Source: Townhall.com
Al-Qaida's Emerging Defeat
By Austin Bay
Wednesday, November 28, 2007
A
youth raises his arms as he cycles with others during a bicycle race in
Falluja, 50 km (30 miles) west of Baghdad November 27, 2007. More than
100 youths participated during Tuesday's bicycle race, the first in
Falluja, organized by the local police with the winner receiving $1000.
REUTERS/Mohanned Faisal (IRAQ)
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